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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
78A-3-102(3)(j) and 78A-4-103(2)(j)? and pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly quashed the service of process on

Defendant Jonathen Kraft attempted through Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-505 (2006)
in its ruling and order dated May 18, 2009.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion to serve

Defendant Jonathen Kraft after the afore-mentioned order and after the last
extension of time to serve had expired as set forth in the trial court's ruling and
order of July 17,2009.
3.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed this matter in its ruling

and order of July 17, 2009.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a procedural rule is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, % 10, 1 P.3d 1087 (citing Ostler v.
Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 5, 989 P.2d 1073). The interpretation of a statute is also a
question of law reviewed for correctness. .See Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283,
% 19, 191 P.3d 1242. "When reviewing [a ruling on] a motion for involuntary
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dismissal, an appellate court should defer to the trial court's findings and
inferences under a clearly erroneous standard and review the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness.*' Markliam v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, %
13, 173 P.3d 865. Finally, as Rule 4 encompasses jurisdictional issues, rulings of
the trial court are reviewed under a coiTection of error standard. See Bonneville
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah App. 1997).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
41-12a-505. Effect upon nonresident of use of state highways.
(1) (a) The use and operation by a nonresident or his agent, or of a resident
who has departed Utah, of a motor vehicle on Utah highways is an
appointment of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as the
true and lawful attorney for service of legal process in any action or
proceeding against the person arising from the use or operation of a motor
vehicle over Utah highways which use or operation results in damages or
loss to person or property.
(b) The use or operation referenced in Subsection (1) is an agreement that
process shall, in any action against the person in which there is such
service, be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon him
personally in Utah.
(2) (a) Service of process under Subsection (1) is made by serving a copy
upon the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code or by filing a
copy in that office with payment of a reasonable fee.
(b) The plaintiff shall, within 10 days after service of process, send notice
of the process together with plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this
section to the defendant by registered mail at the defendant's last-known
address.
(3) (a) The court in which the action is pending may order any
continuance necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to
defend the action, but not exceeding 90 days from the date of filing the
action in court.
(b) The reasonable fee paid by the plaintiff to the Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code is taxed as costs if the plaintiff prevails.
(c) The division shall keep a record of all process served showing the day
and hour of service.
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Rule 4. Process, (Relevant Portion)
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons
and complaint shall be by one of the following methods:
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any
state or judicial district of the United States by the sheriff or constable or
by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's
deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of
service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the person to
be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be
sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the name of the process
and offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as
follows:
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs
(B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process;

(d)(4) Other service.
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are
unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, where
service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person
to be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order
allowing sendee by publication or by some other means. The supporting
affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the
party to be served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to
serve all of the individual parties.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case originates from an automobile accident that occurred August 31,
2000. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17).
B.

Course of Proceedings

The matter had been dismissed previously for failure to serve. (R. 110,
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The matter was re-filed and nine extensions
were requested and granted before the first attempt at service, done through the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, was made in this matter. (R. 110
- 1 1 1 , Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17-21). That service was quashed by order
of the trial Court on May 18, 2009. (R. 110-115, Addendum to Plaintiffs* Brief
17 - 18). Plaintiffs then filed a motion to serve by alternative means, which was
denied and in its denial of that motion the trial court dismissed this matter. (R.
135-138, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13-16).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The matter of the underlying suit stems from an automobile accident which
occurred on August 31, 2006. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The
first filing of the suit was dismissed on April 8, 2005 for failure to serve. (R. 110,
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). The present action was filed on March 30,
2006. (R. 110, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17). Plaintiffs requested and
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received nine extensions for time in which to serve, the last of which was a sixtyday extension granted on December 11, 2008. (R. 110 - 111, Addendum to
Plaintiffs' Brief 17-18). On Januaiy 29, 2009, Plaintiffs served this matter on the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §4112a-505 (2006). (R. 111, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 18). Defendant, through
counsel filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to quash the service of
process. (R. I l l , Addendum to Plaintiffs5 Brief 18). The trial court found that at
not time prior to service had the Plaintiffs requested permission to serve in the
manner and granted the motion in the alternative and quashed the service. (R. 110
- 115, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 17 - 20).
Plaintiffs then filed a motion for alternative service on June 15, 2009. (R.
135, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13). The trial court found that the time for
effectuating service had past and recounted the extensions that had been provided
to Plaintiffs. (R. 135 - 136, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 13 - 14.) The Court
then dismissed this matter on its own motion for failure to timely serve a
defendant in this matter. (R. 138, Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
All the factual findings of the trial court should be accepted as true as they
remained unchallenged by Plaintiffs. Accepting those finding as true, this Court
should first find that trial court properly quashed service in this matter when
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Plaintiffs tried to effect service on Defendant through the Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code. If Plaintiffs did not know the location of Defendant or if
they believed him to be non-resident, they are required to first meet a due
diligence requirement. The trial court then properly denied their motion for
alternative service as it was not filed timely and if it had jurisdiction to grant the
motion, it was still not warranted based the inaction of Plaintiffs. Without timely
service having been accomplished, the trial court properly dismissed the case
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
1.

Ail Facts are Undisputed in this Matter.

Plaintiffs do not dispute the factual findings of the trial court in either of the
trial courts' rulings and orders of May 18, 2009 or July 17, 2009. Accordingly,
the issues before this Court are whether the trial court correctly interpreted Rule 4,
Section 41-12a-505, and controlling case law.
2.

The Trial Court Properly Quashed Service on May 18, 2009,

It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs served the Defendant pursuant to the
requirements of this statute, but did so before any showing of need for alternative
service or seeking leave to do so. Plaintiffs' argument in this matter is that they
are not required by Rule 4 to seek the trial court's permission or to make any
showing to the trial court before utilizing the service process outlined by Section
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41-12a-505.

The trial court, in its ruling, relied on the holding of Carlson v. Bos,

740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987). The Utah Supreme Court held, as noted in the trial
court's ruling, that a plaintiff must show "that diligent efforts have been made to
locate the defendant. Only by making a satisfactory showing of diligence can such
a plaintiff satisfy" due process requirements. Id. at 1276. That case interpreted
the predecessor statute to Section 4 l-12a-505, which was Section 41-12-8. The
Utah Court of Appeals repeated this language in context of Rule 4(g) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 773 (Utah
App. 1997).
Plaintiffs do not argue the holdings of cases, but argue that they were
effecting service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)(A) and that the agent identified in this
portion of Rule includes the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
However, the portion of Rule 4(g) that was the subject of the Bonneville Billing
matter contains identical language of the current Rule 4(d)(4)(A). In Bonneville
Billing, the Utah Court of Appeals quoted Rule 4(g): "Where the identity or
whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained
through reasonable diligence ..., the party seeking service of process may file a
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication,
by mail, or by some other means." Id. at 773. Here, the present language of Rule
4(d)(4)(a) set forth above is identical.
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Iii sum, the present language of Rule 4 is unchanged. Both the Carlson and
Bonneville Billing cases require that Plaintiff first make the due diligence showing
to the Court before alternative service may be effected. Because Plaintiffs failed
to make the requisite showing prior to utilizing the subject statute, the trial court
correctly quashed service.
3.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs Motion for
Alternative Service.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly denied their motion for
alternative service. Plaintiffs rely on Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor. Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) for the proposition that this
case for the proposition that it would be an abuse of discretion for the Court to
have denied their motion. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial
court had a wide range of discretion for dismissing a matter for failure to
prosecute. See id. at 878-79. However, the Supreme Court noted that this
discretion was tempered with conditions to prevent a trial court from acting
arbitrarily. See id. at 879. Plaintiffs then recite the factors set forth in this case
and argue only that dismissal in this case was improper an injustice will result.
First, if the trial court properly quashed service in this matter, then the time
to serve had expired before Plaintiffs' filed their motion for alternative service.
The Court had explicitly informed the Plaintiff that no more extensions were
forthcoming in December of 2008. (R. 23 - 24). As Plaintiffs did not request an
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extension of time for service and failed to file this motion for alternative service
with the time allotted by the trial court, the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant
the motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (stating, as noted by the trial court, if no
party is served timely "the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on
application of any party or upon the court's own initiative."). The term "shall"
provides no discretion to the trial court. Defendant had not been served within the
requisite time period allowed the trial court and Rule and the action had to be
dismissed.
Second, assuming that the trial court could hear the motion for alternative
service and had the discretion to make the determination, Plaintiffs' argument fails
as the trial court did not abuse its discretion if this Court looks to the
Westinghouse standards. First, unlike Westinghouse, the unusual factors, if any,
weigh against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the present action only after a previous
dismissal for failure to prosecute. The present matter was filed on March 30,
2006. Plaintiffs requested and were granted, nine extensions, the last of which
would have expired on February 10, 2009. These extensions extend well beyond
the 120 days explicitly provided for by Rule 4. In fact, reviewing these dates,
Plaintiffs had almost 3 years to serve any defendant in this matter.
Of course this fact weighs against Plaintiffs' first factor to be considered.
Plaintiffs' only attempt at service came at the end of the almost three years in
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which they had time to act. That is inaction and Defendant, in contrast, had no
conduct with which to compare. The same is true of the second factor. Plaintiffs
had their initial time in the first filing to serve and almost three years in which to
attempt service on their second filing. They had every opportunity to serve or to
timely seek alternative service. As to the difficulty factor, the trial court noted in
its Ruling and Order of May 2009, that Plaintiffs lost track of Defendants. (R. I l l ,
Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief 18). That finding is unchallenged. In some, the
difficulty faced by Plaintiffs in now locating the Defendant is one they brought
upon themselves. Finally, the motion should be denied as the motion would have
allowed service some three and half years after the filing of the second action and
nine and half years after the subject accident.1 Obviously, any defendant would be
prejudiced if he were forced to defend an action which is based on facts that
occurred nine years before. Therefore, if this Court determines that the trial court
had discretion to rule on the motion, it should find that the trial court acted within
that discretion when it denied the motion.
4.

The Trial Court Properly Dismissed this Matter-

As set forth in Part 3 above, the trial court properly quashed service and
denied the motion for alternative service. As stated, Rule 4 mandates dismissal if

1

As noted in the trial court's ruling of May 2009, Defendant did raise the due
process issues involved in the trial courts' numerous extensions in this matter. As
the dismissal was not based on those grounds, it is not examined here.
13

a party fails to timely serve a defendant in the case. It shall do so upon a motion
of a party or on its own initiative once service is not timely effected.2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, all the ruling of the trial court should be
affirmed.

DATED THIS 29TH DAY OF

W. KEVTNTANNER
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND
APPELLEE JON ATHEN KRAFT

2

Defendant Jonathen Kraft acknowledges that Rule 4 is a dismissal without
prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the Court. It is correct that if the matter
were refiled and served, Defendant would seek dismissal on due process grounds
relating to the extensions given in this case. However, that issue is not before this
Court as the motion to dismiss was a sua sponte motion by the trial court.
Plaintiffs have taken the position that the dismissal was with prejudice.
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